〈Article〉

In Search of a National Consensus: Explaining Political Deadlock of Haiti in Theoretical Perspective*

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Introduction

On February 7, 2017, the long-awaited presidential inauguration took place at Haitian National Palace, ending a full year of absence of popular-elected president. This absence was a result of postponements of elections, caused by waves of criticisms of opposition groups against electoral processes. The mobilization of the opposition supporters reached its peak in May 2016, when the final report of the Independent Commission of Evaluation and Verification discredited the controversial first round of October 2015 and called for new first round election. In addition, Haiti had also been without legislatures due to the expiration of all deputies in the House of Representatives and two thirds of the senators for one full year until the new legislators took seats in January 2016. The fundamental problem of this political deadlock lies in the absence of a credible electoral and political system that would be acceptable to all social and political actors. The question is, would there be ANY solution that could satisfy all?

If we review the history of the country after independence, political deadlock of this sort is not uncommon in Haiti. In fact, traces of underdevelopment of Haiti are in full force in virtually every aspect; not only politics, but

economy and society. Haiti ranks 163rd out of 188 countries in Human Development Index (UNDP 2015: 210); she also ranks 12th out of 144 in the State Weakness Index (Rice and Patrick 2008: 10). One might ask, but isn't Haiti the first independent state in the world of colored people? Isn't the history of Haiti full of glorious stories of successful slave revolts, converting the hopeless slaves "who died like flies" due to the mistreatment of their masters under French colonial rule, whose plantation economy of sugar was once praised as "Pearl of Antilles", into combatants of an organized army under the leadership of Tussaint Louverture and later Jean-Jacques Dessalines which defeated Napoleon's 22,000 soldiers, as shown in the classic study of C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins*? What went wrong?

There have already been answers to this question, very good ones, actually. First-class researchers on Haiti have mentioned the following factors with various degrees of emphasis on each: negative foreign interventions such as imposing huge amounts of reparations or imposing low rates of import tariffs right after independence; unfortunate results of land reform which brought land tenure of ultra-small land holdings by millions of peasants and the subsequent disappearance of large plantations for export products; political struggle by two racial groups which frequently caused violence thus impeding social peace; intentional underdevelopment and high level of both corruption and brain-drain during the Duvalier dictatorship; a consolidated spoil-system in which no public project with genuine national interest takes place; recent flood of foreign aid of free or low-price goods which crashed domestic market for peasants and also small businesses (Robinson 2007; Ferguson 1987; Nicholls 1996; Abbott 1988; Diederich 2008; Diederich 2011; Diederich 2015; Fatton 2002; Fatton 2007; Fatton 2014; Truoillot 1990; Bulmer-Thomas 2014; Lundahl 1984; Schwartz 2010).

While these studies detailed how the Haitian Revolution came about, how

newly-independent Haiti was treated by Great Powers, how it fell under the U.S. influence, and how predatory Haitian state had become, the challenges of explaining Haiti still remain: political theories and ideologies were rarely put to the test on Haitian history. The key to understand politics of Haiti is to make it comparable to other cases of developing countries; to make comparable, these phenomenon have to be conceptualized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is not to reevaluate convincing explanations of above-mentioned studies on Haiti; rather, using the framework of existing international political theories and also comparative political theories as tools, this article attempts to draw a big picture, a picture of a map of political transformation and see where Haiti has been placed. The fundamental argument is that Haitian history is the constant failure of reaching a national consensus, a "basic consensus of ultimate values such as freedom and equality" (Sartori 1987: 90). While political competition for public offices and the system in which the candidates who receives the most votes take offices are the hearts of democracy, without this basic consensus among major political groups, a minority could be motivated to overthrow the government thus democracy would not become "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5). As this article is about to demonstrate, Haiti has been trying but failed to build consensus related to the following three questions: (a) sovereignty question of three different kinds, (b) social question regarding race solidarity versus national unity, and (c) political-economic question regarding populism versus liberal democracy or class struggle versus capitalist development. In this sense, Haiti's international dependence and past consolidation of dictatorship are reflections of competing ideologies regarding these questions.

　The following is divided in four parts. In this article, the analyzing concepts are different for each question, and in the first section, the framework of analysis is explained. The second section deals with the first question, sov-

ereignty, in Haiti. It is going to be shown that out of three different kinds of sovereignty, early Haitian leaders had to choose one or two at the expense of another thus undermining the future development of Haiti. The third section is about the color question in conflict with the idea of national unity. The basic argument is that in Haiti, color politics was fully employed by the Duvalier dictatorship for the first time and this discourse is still effective today. The fourth section deals with the political-economic question of liberal democracy in conflict with populism. The fact that the fall of dictatorship had elevated the Haitian mass's expectation for a better life and their disillusionment with liberal democracy will be analyzed in this last section. Now let us turn to the first section.

I   Analytical Framework

It can be said that science started as an attempt of finding ways to overcome the state of misery and improve conditions of human life. While natural science mainly focuses on developing technology or engineering to solve problems, the subject of political science is formation of the government, currently the highest form of human organization. The highlight of this science was to call for sovereignty of the state represented by divine kings, arguing that one has to submit to the ruler so that the ruler protects the subject (Bodin 1992). However, when the abuse of power by such rulers who were in constant war with one another became threatening to the very lives of the subjects, two solutions were employed: first, international law so that major wars could be avoided (Grotius 2012), and secondly, democratization so that human rights abuse by rulers could be halted (Rousseau 1987). Accordingly, self-determination of each ethnic group was adopted as a part of democratization process (Anderson 2006). Out of this evolution of states, the modern states are now believed to have three basic characteristics: sovereignty as de-

fined by international law, nation-state, and democracy. As a result of long try-and-error process that started in 16th century Europe, these three characteristics came to be shared by nearly all developed states.

In contrast to developed states, most of the newly-independent developing countries have or had to start from scratch. From the moment of declaring their independence, these states find themselves entangled between domestic and international parameters, basically concerning these three questions of sovereignty, nation-states, and democracy. Of the basic three premises of the state, this article applies the following concepts for each question: Krasner's concept of different kinds of sovereignty, Hobsbawm's concept of nationalism and nation-building, and theories of liberal democracy and their implications to market economy.

Let us consider first, sovereignty of the developing countries. In the system of sovereign states, founded in 1648 at the signing of the Treaties of Westphalia, there is no higher level of authority above these states, as have been explained by existing international political theories. However, this system of "no effective world government" could lead to complete anarchy, "a war as is of every man against every man" (Hobbes 2016: 1525). The solution was the creation of international law under which there is a minimum set of rules that states have to respect and under which all states are considered equal (Schuman 1969: 68–72). However, being equal isn't that easy; there are in fact four different concepts of sovereignty according to Krasner, and of these four, the first three are considered very useful to understand the situation of newly independent states like early 19th century Haiti. First, a certain would-be state has to be recognized by others. This would-be state is not considered equal to other members until other members accept it as a member. Secondly, even after a newly formed state earns recognition by other members, this does NOT mean that the right to rule its territory exclusively

is automatically protected. Since there is no ultimate authority above sovereign-states such as world law-enforcement forces, smaller and weaker states are often the subject of intervention by larger and stronger states. Lastly, even with the recognition by other states and also the respect of others to its authority to rule exclusively without foreign intervention, there is yet another challenge: unification and consolidation of domestic authority. A country could be independent, but there could be more than one claim to be "sovereign" (Krasner 1999: 14–15). For a newly-independent country, maintaining all three kinds of sovereignty is nearly an impossible task, and of these three different types, which of sovereignties a state prioritizes to maintain could often determine the course of history of newly independent country.

Sovereignty is not the only challenge that newly independent states have to solve. As Hobsbawm has shown in his classic study of nationalism, revolutionary leaders, who had defeated the royal government, usually face new challenges of how to gain and keep loyalties from the new sovereign: the people or the nation. Kings, who claimed their right to rule based on "divine rights," were no longer sovereign. According to Hobsbawm, there are some successful cases in which the new rulers claimed their rights based on their revolutionary ideology, such as "freedom, equality, fraternity" in France or "freedom" in the United States. In these cases, a type of "non-ethnic state nationalism" was constructed and reproduced over generations and became the ultimate source of national unity (Hobsbawm 1991: 19–21). However, there is yet another type of nationalism in contrast to this one. It is a type of nationalism based on ethnicity or blood. When this type of "ethnic nationalism" became dominant in the latter half of 19th century Europe, it became problematic because their claim of being a sovereign state contradicts some other ethnic group of being a sovereign within the same territory. If there is only one conceivable ethnic group in a given territory, there is even more

chance of obtaining national unity, but if there is more than one, it means constant social conflict between or among these ethnic groups (Hobsbawm 1991: 93), and this problem of defining eligible citizens has to be solved before any type of democratization begins (Linz and Stepan 1996: 26–27).

　Lastly, the newly independent states, soon or later, have to come up with the definite form of the government. Of all types of political systems, liberal democracy is the type widely accepted by developed countries. While liberty was an essential value to defend, the ideological founders of liberal democracy recognized the need for each citizen to respect laws, because liberty has no use in a state of complete anarchy (Locke 2014: 2666; Rousseau 1987: 42). Their solution was a representative democracy with a division of power among government, legislatures, and justice. The idea was to deter "private will" or "abuse of equal rights" or "overruling of the legislature" and protect "general will (national interest)" (Rousseau 1987: 26; Montesquieu 2011: 108; Hamilton, Alexander, Madison and Jay 2015: 1016). Good, one might suppose, this is perfect for any developing countries. However, we have to recall that the original intent of this division of power was to prevent dictatorship by a majority, namely, the popular class. In fact, one critical feature of liberal democracy is its imposition of legality that all citizens are required to accept its legal system and to act within the law. Because of the division of power, it is actually very difficult to pass a bill to restructure the socio-economic system drastically. Therefore, liberal democracy is a type of democracy suitable to keep the status quo, namely, economy dominated by established elites. This is why Joseph Schumpeter, in his famous work *Capitalism*, *Socialism*, *and Democracy*, concluded that liberal democracy is the best political system for capitalism. On the other hand, if democracy is interpreted simply as "majority rule," the notion of constitutionalism or protection of the rights of the minority could be overlooked. The result is populism in which

"only two goals to be maximized at the expense of all other goals: political equality and popular sovereignty" (Dahl 1956: 50). This exclusion of economic elites from power, in many cases, have led such elites to employ violence to overthrow elected governments and a country could be caught in a vicious circle of political instability and use of violence.

Now let us turn to analyzing Haitian political transformation. Of three questions concerning national consensus, the question of sovereignty is the first to be put to the test.

II   Question of Sovereignty: Sovereign State, Foreign Intervention, and Consolidation of Authority

Haitian Revolution was not just a revolution in which the Haitian masses gained their rights, but it was a struggle to gain independence. After declaring independence, though, the leaders of Haiti faced the first question of sovereignty: (non-) recognition by other states. While they fought against France for their own cause, freedom, both competing leaders, Henri Christophe of the North and Alexandre Pétion of the South, and later by Jean-Pierre Boyer who unified Haiti, all considered international recognition to be essential. However, neither the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, nor other neighboring Latin American states (which declared their independence after Haiti) recognized Haiti. To the leaders of newly formed Haiti, France, whom they revolted against, was the only country who offered recognition, in exchange for special commercial treatment and reparation of 150 million francs, later reduced to 90 million.

Yes, this payment of indemnification did certainly cause financial trouble and thus left Haiti with limited space to develop. However, it was also the decision made by the leaders of Haiti to take that opportunity to become a member of the international society of sovereign states. According to David

Nicholls, a well-known scholar on Haitian politics and history, these leaders, who unified Haiti after civil war belonged to a mulatto social strata and were desperate to get recognition because they did not want the other group, namely, blacks, to be the representative of the sovereign Haiti. According to Nicholls, Haiti agreed to bow under French demands in consideration to win over their domestic rivals (Nicholls 1996: 63).

Thus, through this recognition process, Haitian rulers prioritized two of three kinds of sovereignty: "being an independent state (first type)" and "establishing a single authority over territory (third type)." For the time being, President Boyer and his allies took the lead in a domestic race of Haitian leadership, being recognized by France as sovereign, and also being recognized by other political leaders as a president because of this international recognition. However, this recognition by France, in exchange for reparation, was accomplished at the expense of another type of sovereignty, that of the right for exclusive authority without foreign intervention (second type): U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934.

The reasons why Haiti became a subject of military control of the United States, and the way it was carried out, have been well studied. To summarize, it was the time of U.S. Big Stick policy that, while the U.S. considered any possibility of European Power to extend its control over Latin American countries as a threat to U.S. security, German merchants were extending its control over Haiti's imports and exports and over government finance (Schmidt 1995: 35). The vulnerability of the Haitian economy after the downturn of the economy in 1890, caused a halt to payments to European financial institutions including the reparation to France (Goldstein Sepinwall 2013: 106). The situation was serious and the U.S. officials were so concerned about the indebtedness of the Haitian government that they actually feared that this debt could bring military intervention of European countries

(United States Department of State 1940: 462–464).

This fear of the United States was not totally "imaginary" considering signs of military intervention by Britain and Germany. Siding with the government of Fabre Geffrard, in 1865, British gunboats bombed the northern Haitian town of Cap Haïtien which was taken by the rebels. As for Germans, in 1872 German battleships blocked the bay of Port-au-Prince to demand the payment of the Haitian government for the damages of German merchants caused by British bombing (Nicholls 1985, 109). The Germans also were main suppliers of arms to anti-governmental groups, and their move was the decisive factor of the outcome of presidential competition between Anténor Firmin and Nord Alexis in 1902, which Alexis won (Dubois 2012: 200).

At the height of American fear against Germans, in 1915, Haiti slipped into a state of anarchy so chaotic that the president of the republic was dragged out of the French legation where he sought asylum and murdered by the mob. The same day, the U.S.S. *Washington* entered the bay of Port-au-Prince while the U.S. Navy asked France and Britain not to bring their ships to Haiti (United States Department of State 1934: 475). This "threat of European Powers to control Haiti" was quickly absolved when the New York-based National City Bank took control of *Banque Nationale*, and U.S. officials took control of the Haitian customs house.

The U.S. government was anxious to "legalize" the occupation, and the treaty was signed by the two governments. Therefore, the Haitian state did not disappear and sovereignty in the first sense was kept. But the sovereignty of the Haitian state, in the second sense, was seriously challenged due to the presence of the American High Commissioner, the ultimate source of legislative decisions for Haitians; the Marines, the guarantor of Haitian law enforcement *Le Garde*; and the Treaty Officials, the American public officials who were in charge of public administration, as have been shown in the re-

port of United States Senate in 1922. The highlight of Haitian sovereignty of this kind was the constitutional reform of enabling foreign nationals to own land in Haiti. This reform was repeatedly rejected by the Haitian legislators and was made possible only after the U.S. official broke into the session of the legislature to read the order of the Haitian president to dissolve the legislature (Schmidt 1995: 97).

During the occupation, however, the problems of the sovereignty of the third kind, with the multiple social forces claiming Haitian government, was solved, at least temporarily. The peasants of Haitian north, known as *cacos*, had been the source of instability for generations. It was a routine of Haitian politics that the *cacos*, recruited by regional lords, marched into the capital to topple the government. After the famous uprising of the *cacos* from 1917 to 1920, the Marines and *Le Garde* successfully conquered the country.

The United States decided to withdraw from Haiti after the 1929 revolt of peasants and students. According to the official report of a commission appointed by President Hoover, the U.S. policy of forcing the Haitian government to prioritize the service of the foreign debt may have caused resentment among Haitians (United States Department of State 1945: 236). The plan was to "haitinize" the public administration gradually, and that meant the Haitians themselves were to have an authority over their economic and social affairs, in condition that Haitians keep social peace and avoid anarchy.

However, as the current situation of Haiti shows, Haiti came under the strong influence of foreign powers again. After the end of U.S. occupation in 1934, there were some incidents of political unrest, but neither the 1946 Revolution (referred by most Haitian historians with the capital "R"), in which the general strike had caused the government collapse for the first time in history of Haiti and brought the first black president after the U.S. occupation, nor the subsequent Duvalier rule were considered politically instable

enough for the United States to intervene directly, until 1986. It was after 1986, that Haiti became the subject of foreign intervention for another time.

As will be analyzed in the fourth section of this article Haitian political instability of the post-Duvalier era could be described as the repeated election of, and repeated rejection of Bertrand Aristide by Haitian elites and to a lesser degree, by the United States. For the purpose of this section, this instability is analyzed in terms of sovereignty.

The diplomatic and military effort for restitution of President Aristide in 1994 by the United Nations (i.e., international community with the strong presence of the United States) after the military coup might be explained by a kind of post-Cold War euphoria prone for "ethical diplomacy." However, as has been argued by David Chandler in a book on humanitarian interventions, the problem of "ethical diplomacy" is that it could jeopardize the government's other interests because this policy is endless without direct military intervention. Naturally, the policy makers of the developed countries, including that of the United States, are forced to act selectively on the issue (Chandler 2002: 82–83). Direct military intervention by the United States to reinstall President Aristide, thus, should be understood more in terms of other American interest: halting the flood of Haitian boat people to the United States. Faced with severe human rights violation by the military, thousands of Haitians jumped into the sea for the sake of being rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard. This magnitude of the Haitian refugee flood gave an eye-catching title to a chapter, "Haitian Invasion of the United States" in Girard's book on Haiti (Girard 2010: 133), but unfortunately, these boat people were not welcomed and were sent to Guantanamo naval base which was quickly filled with 9,000 Haitians (Girard 2010: 140). At that time drug smuggling was not a major issue of U.S.-Haitian relations, and President Clinton publicly admitted that the flood of boat people was the major factor behind his de-

cision for direct military intervention (Girard 2010: 221). In addition, it is said that Aristide utilized the boat people as leverage to push U.S. intervention against the military government of Haiti (Nicholls 1998: 177).

This decisive move of military intervention by the United States should be interpreted as the beginning of the new era. If Haiti becomes the source of massive boat people, the United States would mobilize herself and international organization to halt the immigration. It is within this framework that the "kidnapping" and "forced resignation" (Robinson 2007: 198–201, 215–216) of the same President Aristide by the U.S. Embassy occurred in 2004. At the height of violence caused by the *Chimères* gang group, the probability of civil war was considerably high (Fatton 2007: 210). Being reluctant to send the Marines to fight and conquer the *Chimères* but wanting to avoid another wave of boat people, the best choice for the United States government was to get the source of the trouble, Aristide, out of Haiti. In a sense, it was Aristide himself, who chose to return to Haiti by the foreign intervention in 1994, that encouraged the United States in 2004 to carry out a "coup" to avoid Haitian civil war.

Foreign governments and international governmental organizations are not the only source of the sovereignty dilemma for Haiti. Haiti is the subject of constant watch of Haitian diaspora, and even during the United Nations sanctions toward the military government of Haiti from 1991 to 1994, humanitarian aid by the NGOs were abundant. Haiti became so dependent on NGOs, that it is said that 80% of social services were supplied by NGOs (Fatton 2014: 108). This massive aid has created a "parallel state", undermining the Haitian government's control over domestic affairs (Schuller 2012: 412). In fact, local NGOs are so dependent on foreign funding that virtually all projects they carry out are of donors and there is little room for their own projects. Thus, Haiti is now under a "new dictatorship" in which local NGOs be-

came no more than the agents of foreign policy of the donor countries (Podur 2012: 5).

This dependence on foreign aid and incidental foreign intervention to Haitian domestic affairs by donor countries have caused yet another problem: low intensity of democracy. The voters᾽ apathy toward elections are so widespread that the official account of 18% turnout for the senatorial election in August 2015 was said to be "an invention" and the real account should have been even lower (author᾽s interview with Robert Fatton in Charlottesville, Virginia, United States, on September 10, 2015). In fact, in Haiti it is no secret that in the 2010 presidential election, the results of the first round was altered so that the U.S.-supported candidate could have a better chance in the second round (Fatton 2014: 93). The background of U.S. intervention in the Haitian electoral process will be analyzed in the fourth section of this paper; for the purpose of this second section, it is important to understand that the apathy of Haitian voters and discredibility of the political system damage the consolidation of the third type of sovereignty: consolidation of domestic authority.

To conclude the second section, Haiti has been in a constant struggle of three different kinds of sovereignty. Ideally, Haiti should have preserved all three kinds of sovereignty, however, the leaders often had to make decisions of which to preserve. The pattern was that the internal (domestic) rivalry of social groups undermined the sovereignty of the second kind, the right to expel foreign influence. The next section deals with the origin of this internal rivalry.

III   Social Question of Color Dominance versus National Unity

In Haiti, the social question of color has been present since the war of independence. It is true that Haitian independence owes much to the united ef-

fort of all colored people, however, the collaboration of mulattoes who were properted classes and were a minority of the colony, with the blacks, who were slaves and were a majority, were precarious at best, since their goals of "achieving freedom" did not necessarily mean the same thing. The mulattoes had revolted even before the major slave revolt of 1791, for the sake of achieving the same equal rights as whites enjoyed, and as slave owners, emancipation was the secondary subject for them. After the slave revolt, the mulattoes even tried to convince the white rulers that mulattoes were capable of "appeasing" the slaves since they were both of African descent, so that whites should give the mulattoes equal rights. They did gain their rights, but in the end, mulattoes sided with the black slaves because mulattoes finally gave up trusting the French to keep their word of giving them equal rights (Fick 1990: 229). However, the rivalry between mulattoes and blacks reappeared as soon as they defeated France (Nicholls 1996: 8).

If we apply the theory of two different types of nationalism, the one of ideological legitimation, and the other of ethnic legitimation, to Haiti, it does not take too much effort to find out that this second type of nationalism is stronger in Haiti. In addition to an ambiguous role of the mulattoes in the Haitian Revolution, the difficulty of national unity in Haiti lies in its clear, visible social division. There have been some criticisms against the theory of color being an independent variable (Dupuy 2013: 43–44); however, close examination of the theory reveals that this school of thought does not deny the existence of class division that most mulattoes belong to economic elites and most blacks belong to the lower strata of peasants or middle class. The controversy concerning this theory is NOT whether the color question is valid or invalid to understand Haiti, but how this color question is used to gain economic or political control (Matthew Smith 2009: 6). The typical case of such use of color question is the Duvalier regime.

The black movement in Haiti started as a movement to unify all Haitians. Under occupation, much of Haitian academics' cultural tradition of France was denied or ignored by the U.S. occupation forces, and Haitians faced a U.S. culture in which colored people were treated like second-class citizens at best. The rise of the Haitian *indigenisme* (or sometimes called *négritude*) of Jean Price-Mars, should be understood in this context of "identity crisis" (Schmidt 1995: 150). Price-Mars' thesis is that Haitians should overcome their inferiority complex and should be proud to have a culture of African origin. The goal of his movement was to unite all Haitians, black and mulatto, rich and poor, so that Haiti could avoid foreign occupation in the future (Antoine 1981: 140). His book, a novel, *Ainsi Parla l'Oncle*, is known to be the masterpiece of *indigenisme*, and his argument was well received by Haitians. Among them was the group of students who were to lead yet another type of black movement, *noirisme* movement. According to Haitian historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *noirisme* was a political movement and should be distinguished from Price-Mars's *indigenisme* which inclines to theoretical and academic discussions (Trouillot 1990: 131). However, this distinction is often overlooked, and could lead to a radical and violent political movement.

Young professionals, to whom Jean Price-Mars became an idol, made their own version of the movement. To them, the *noiristes*, it was vital to strip mulattoes of their privilege and empower blacks instead. In black people, they argued, African culture was biologically embedded, and to make the most of its superiority, some drastic reform of the social system was needed. In contrast to Price-Mars who called for unity of all Haitians, these *noiristes* called for racial unity, and demanded a privileged position of blacks (Dupuy 2013: 51). According to them, the "natural rights" of blacks were obvious because of their contribution to independence (Matthew Smith 2009: 25).

The *noiristes*' success of electing the black president, Dumarsais Estimé,

in 1946, was the beginning of the rise of a particular group of blacks: the middle class. Since the inauguration of Estimé, the government scholarships aimed at blacks were expanded and more and more governmental positions and officer positions of the Army (converted from *Le Garde d'Haiti*) were given to blacks. However, an analysis of the Estimé government reveals that his black policy contributed to nepotism of blacks, including the officers of the Army. And it was the Army, with its function as an organizer of the elections, which was the ultimate decision maker of who would be the next president (Matthew Smith 2009: 112).

To those who claim to be "true *noiristes*," installing black presidents was not enough. None of the drastic social reforms was carried out by either Estimé or the following Paul Magloire, and it made the *noiristes* even more active than before. Among them was François Duvalier.

The election and the crime of immense magnitude of human rights abuse of François "Papa Doc" Duvalier are well documented. Duvalier skillfully outmaneuvered both Paul Magloire, a black military strong man, and the black leader of the labor movement, Daniel Fignolé, and drove them to take refuge as exiles. Out of the remaining candidates, it was the Army who chose Duvalier to be elected after manipulating the vote count (Diederich 2008: 102). However, Duvalier did not become the puppet of the Army, instead he rose to power at the level that no previous Haitian president had achieved. Rather than depending on the Army, he created his own militia and ruled the country with terror. The fact that Haitians, whose families and friends fell to the hands of the *Tonton Macoutes*, and who often had to share the neighborhood with those *Macouts*, who took the victims' properties, gave a journalist an inspiration for the title, *Murderers Among Us*, to his book (Diederich 2015). For the purpose of this article, it is important to note Duvalier's strategy to legitimize this overwhelmingly dictatorial government.

As has been shown, previous black presidents, after the 1946 Revolution, served to the benefits of the black middle class by promoting them to important government and military positions. But none of the Haitian governments had mobilized black peasants and the poor. It was they of whom that Duvalier vigorously sought the support. The result was the previously mentioned *Tonton Macoutes*. For the sake of black movement rhetoric and also for the more practical reason of requiring a reliable security force other than the Haitian Armed Forces (renamed and restructured under Duvalier), estimated tens of thousands of *Tonton Macoutes* were mobilized and became the core of Duvalier's support. The majority of the *Macoutes* leaders were peasants (in Haiti, most of them were small land holders), and they were eager to support Duvalier, who gave them back their weapons once taken away under U.S. occupation. There has been pointed out the conservative nature of Haitian peasants and therefore one cannot presuppose the unity of an all- black popular class (Nicholls 1985: 184). The possible interpretation of this "unified popular class blacks under Duvalier" is that relatively well-to-do black peasants, as leaders of the *Macoutes*, were able to mobilize other blacks in the name of black unity. Another factor that brought black peasant support to Duvalier was his effective appeal of Voodoo. Duvalier not only appeared in public in Voodoo costume for ceremony, he had his militia violently attack those who promoted an anti-voodoo campaign in the 1940s (Diederich 2011: 130–132). Whether Duvalier was merely using the black movement rhetoric only for the sake of gaining and keeping power was difficult to conclude. However, one thing is certain; his use of black rhetoric was very effective to mobilize black peasant and mass support.

Duvalier's prolonged rule as president-for-life and relatively peaceful transition of power to his son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, was not made possible without support or submission of non-peasants. Promotion of the

black middle class to governmental positions and that of the military continued after Duvalier's inauguration. Moreover, the social-economic structure of mulatto supremacy, to which Duvalier repeatedly accused against, was virtually untouched during the Duvalier years. How could this be possible? How could Duvalier enjoy support of the black peasants and masses at the same time he satisfied the needs of the mulatto elite? According to some Haitian analysts, perpetuity of underdevelopment by not altering socio-economic structure was itself the exact goal of Duvalier. The logic is the following: the poor blacks had to be kept poor so that Duvalier could keep blaming mulattoes and could stay as the leader of the *noirisme* forever (Trouillot 1990 : 159). It was ironic that during the Duvalier era, under the supreme leader of the black movement, the "historic compromise" of blacks in control of the state apparatus and mulattoes in control of the economy was achieved (Fatton 2002: 56).

It has been 31 years since the government of Baby Doc fell. One might wonder, has color politics, which François Duvalier started, long gone? Far from it. The question of color actually dominates the field of Haitian politics. The black masses, under the influence of *noirisme* rhetoric, demands what Duvalier had promised, and "blackness" is always needed for legitimate public policy (Trouillot 1990: 118). And in extreme cases their "natural rights" of dominating Haitian politics legitimizes violence against mulattoes, and there have been cases where elite mulattoes were forced to go into exile or killed, even though they were friends of Aristide (Fatton 2007: 100). This legitimation of violence, in turn, legitimizes the use of violence for mulatto elites, in the name of their defense. It is no accident that one of the leaders of former-military-turned-paramilitary groups, Guy Phillippe, had no trouble finding their source of funding not only to have his armed bands attack police stations repeatedly, but also to campaign for the senatorial seat until he

was finally elected in January 2017. Although Philippe did not actually take seat because he was arrested and extradited to the United States on drug charges a few days before inauguration of the new Senate, these paramilitary groups have no difficulty to find other ex-military leaders to replace Philippe and the vicious circle of violence seems endless in Haiti.

To summarize this section, there are two competing ideologies of nationalism related to color. Surpassing the one calling for unity of all races, the dominant ideology is the other one calling for black dominance. So far this ideology has been used to gain support of black peasants, but its effectiveness to bring about Haiti's development has not been proven. Rather, it has led Haiti to a high level of polarization. This social question of color has other aspects in Haiti, both political and economic ones, and the polarization on these aspects is explained in the next section.

IV   Political and Economic Question of Liberal Democracy with Capitalist Development versus Populism

When Toussaint Louverture started revolution against France, his aim was to gain freedom. And at the end of the revolutionary struggle, basically all Haitians agreed that freedom meant liberation of slaves, but on other aspects, they disagreed. In fact, what "freedom" meant was different for each social group. To former slaves, it was to keep and expand their "kitchen land," on which slaves were allowed to grow their staple food and to sell their surplus crops in Sunday markets. In contrast, to the leaders of the Revolution, black as well as mulattoes, freedom meant constructing a solid national economy of capitalist accumulation. This actually meant that the elites were trying to maintain, or even to expand, the plantation economy which was the heart of the colonial rule. Their plan to keep the former slaves attached to the plantations did not succeed, as the fate of a well-known 1826 Rural Code shows,

and the division of land progressed gradually, to the point that sugar was no longer Haitiʼs main export. Even where the large plantations were kept, former slaves were not converted into mere plantation workers, and the practice of share-cropping became widespread (Lundahl 1979: 22). Thus, the majority of former slaves became land-owning peasants, but that is not the end of the story. To oneʼs amazement, this gap of interpretation of "freedom," which dates back to the revolutionary era, still is the source of bitter conflict in Haiti.

When Duvalier fell in 1986, Haiti was, no doubt, to go through democratization. They all agreed that human rights abuses were to be abolished, but on other grounds, what "democracy" meant was different for each social group. On the edge of expanding political participation to all Haitians, the question of liberal democracy arose. While widely accepted as the ideal model of all political systems, liberal democracy does not guarantee social justice in the sense that the poor hopes to improve his or her standard of living.

It is in this context that Haitian democratization after the Duvalier era has to be understood. To the Haitian masses, democratization meant a better standard of living as quickly as possible, naturally leading to a broad distribution of wealth. To Haitian economic elites, democratization meant better capitalist development with a better chance of investing, leading to a liberalized economic system, but not to the radical restructuring of a socio-economic system in which elites would lose privileges. This gap of understanding of what democracy is explains why Aristide, who is worshiped in place of Jesus by the Haitian masses according to Jennie Smith (Jennie Smith 2001: 61), is feared by the mulatto elite and to a lesser degree, the black middle class. Aristideʼs first presidential term, because he had to spend mostly in exile, was too short to transform Haiti economically and socially, but the fact that he raised the minimum wage by 60 percent and that he fired 8,000 public ser-

vants and all senior officers of the military were considered a severe blow to the elites and middle class (Girard 2010: 124–125). When president Aristide heard a rumor of a coup, he could not count on senior officers who stood with him during an attempted coup before his inauguration, because he had fired all of them shortly after the inauguration. That he turned to the support of the militia and called for violence against "his enemies" in his defense, was the final blow for the military and elites to oust him (Girard 2010: 210). In addition, this fear against Aristide is partly shared by the international community, namely the United States, a champion of liberal democracy.

The problem of political and economic question gets another level if we take the matter of sovereignty with it. After Duvalier, Haiti came under the strong influence of the United States, and anyone who wished to earn recognition as a sovereign by the United States government, was required to meet U.S. demands of establishing a market economy. The imposition of a market economy after Duvalier and its result clearly shows the contradictions of a liberal democracy in Haiti. The import tariffs were quickly lowered and the monopoly of state firms were abolished, while Haitian peasants and industries were not absolutely ready to compete with the US and other developed countries (Lundahl 1997: 77–86). In addition, the Haitian staple market crashed after thousands of tonnage of U.S. rice and other grains flooded the markets and streets of Haiti, under the name of "aid." There have been studies that showed the decrease, not the increase of farmers' income and the worsening, not improving of children's malnutrition after the arrival of U.S. grains (Lundahl 1997: 77–86). The domestic rice production virtually went extinct (Fatton 2014: 103). To the Haitian masses, who suffer the lowest standard of living in Latin America, liberal democracy is the most apparent phenomenon of "Duvalierism after Duvalier". Even in in the era of "liberal democracy," the social and economic structure still remains unchanged and

the suffering of the masses still continues even after the fall of military governments.

President Aristide's resistance to economic liberalization should be understood in this context. During his exile in Washington D.C., he had promised international donors including the United States to carry out privatization of state enterprises as an effort of structural adjustment. However, after he was reinstated, having seen a massive demonstration of Haitians against privatization, he refused to privatize them during his presidency, and after his term was over, he kept mobilizing the population against it during the next tenure of René Préval (Girard 2010: 156, 173, 179).

One might wonder that the stagnation of the Haitian economy is traceable to "incomplete" implementation of liberalization, and the situation certainly would improve after carrying out certain developmental projects, like the concentration of land and efficient production of export crops. However, this path is not conceivable in Haiti because of the highly insecure land tenure system. In fact, as recent as in 2012, less than 5% of land was actually registered in the public record, and in Haiti, the peasants usually "prove" their land ownership by inheritance or verbal testimony of neighbors (Earth Institute 2012: 8–9). While improvement of land registration would benefit the peasants and would be welcomed by them elsewhere, in Haiti, any "game-changing" attempt could be considered or interpreted negatively by peasants (Bloch, Lambert, Singer 1999: 73). The typical case is the 1987 Jean-Rabel incident in which the violent encounter of two peasant groups, one for land reform and the other against, left hundreds of people dead (Schwartz 2010: 73). Among peasants, the fear of losing "their own" land, be it legal or not legal, is so serious that talking about the benefit of economic liberalization would not be convincing.

The controversy on liberal democracy gets more and more complex in

conjunction with the question of color. There have been and there will be, for the foreseeable future, the political groups that would try to mobilize and utilize this frustration of the Haitian masses. The less the social change becomes plausible, the more the Haitian masses get attracted to the *noirisme* that could turn Haiti into violence. In this sense, the color rhetoric that Duvalier had transformed and consolidated, is very much alive in Haiti today.

To summarize, the political and economic questions that have dominated Haiti since independence have not yet found a peaceful solution. The claims for "natural rights" by different social groups have not been mutually mitigated, and it seems that a zero-sum game is the rule.

Conclusions

This article attempted to explain history of Haitian politics by using well-known theories of international politics and also comparative politics. Regarding three questions of sovereignty, nationalism, and liberal democracy, Haiti has not reached a national consensus, "the basic consensus" so fundamental to the construction of any democracy. As most readers probably have thought, these questions not being resolved to reach a consensus were not unique to Haiti. What is unique about Haiti is its complication of three closely related questions. All questions are so inter-twined that one cannot think of where to start.

This type of analysis, giving a theoretical background to understand the political deadlock of a developing country and not presenting the definite solutions, or even worse, not even settling the debate of Dogan-Higley versus Knight on the causal relationship among political crises, changes to elite configuration, and regime change (Knight 1998), might have been unsatisfactory or even disappointing to some readers. However, implication of the very fact that the existing theories simply cannot give definite solutions to a country

like Haiti should be stressed here. These theories, born in and born for the benefit of European (now developed) countries, and when applied to developing countries, exhibit a limitation that is striking. What this article has shown, therefore, could be an antithesis of the existing theories of political development, most of which tend to see liberal democracy not only as an ideal but a necessary result. The time has come to think that there may be something wrong with the theories, and not with Haiti.

Meanwhile, the struggles to construct national consensus continue in Haiti. One such example of this "impossible task" is a project to reach an educational accord. This "National Pact for the Quality of Education" has already collected over 25,000 signatures of teachers, unions, and socio-professional associates (Haiti Libre 2016). According to Jacky Lumarque, one of the organizers of this pact, education is considered the least controversial field in terms of reaching national accord, because "nobody is against giving quality education" (Interview with the author on March 19, 2015 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti). When and if his effort bears fruit and leads to Haiti's "basic consensus", there should be another article to study the process, possibly with reformed theories, to present a definite solution to other cases of political deadlock.

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〈要旨〉

国民的コンセンサスを求めて：
理論で説明するハイチの政治的膠着

<div align="right">尾　尻　希　和</div>

　ハイチの独立以後の政治的、社会的、経済的不振の要因としてはすでに先行研究において、フランスに押しつけられた巨額の補償金支払いなどにより国家建設に割く余力が奪われてしまったこと、農地の分割が進み零細農地がほとんどを占めているために競争力のある輸出農業が育成できないこと、デュバリエ独裁において意図的に開発が行われなかったこと、国家が蓄財のための道具と化しており真の意味での公共事業はほとんど行われてこなかったこと、民主化以後の急激な自由主義経済の導入や「援助」名目での安い穀物の流入により国内産業や農業が打撃を受けてしまったこと、などが挙げられている。

　本稿は、これら、先行研究が指摘したハイチの諸問題の要因を再構成し、既存の国際政治の理論と比較政治の理論を用いて独立以後のハイチを分析することで、ハイチ政治を他の発展途上国と比較可能にすることを目指した。主な議論は、次の3つの分野で国民的コンセンサスが未だ形成されていない、というものである。

　第一に、「主権」の分野では、国際社会に独立国として認められるという目標、外国の介入を受けずに統治するという目標、国内を統一し唯一の権威を創出するという目標、の3つの目標のうち、ハイチはすべてをスムーズに達成することはできなかった。結果として指導者らが自分の利益を守るため

に第一、第三の目標を優先させたために第二の主権は犠牲にされてしまった。ハイチでは現在も、3つのすべての主権が達成されず、どの主権を優先するかという問題で意見の一致はみられない。

　第二に、ハイチを統合するイデオロギーの分野では、革命などのイデオロギーで団結する、非エスニックなナショナリズムと違い、ハイチでは人種にもとづくエスニック・ナショナリズムが政治的に利用されるようになったことを指摘した。人種の団結を呼びかけて政治動員を行う手法を大々的に用いたはじめての政権がデュバリエ独裁であったが、同政権崩壊後も、この政治レトリックはハイチでは有効であり、少数派も含むナショナリズムの形成は阻害されている。

　第三に、政治経済体制の分野では、ハイチ大衆が望む政治経済体制が、ハイチのエリート層やハイチのドナー国が望むリベラル・デモクラシーとは異なるという問題を取りあげた。リベラル・デモクラシーでは大衆が望む大胆な社会経済改革は否定されるため、ハイチ大衆の間では不信感が高まっている。民主化以後のハイチはこの分野でも国民的コンセンサスがない状態である。

　本稿の最後では、これまでの政治理論が、ハイチのような発展途上国が抱える課題の解決方法を提示できていないことを指摘しつつ、それが政治理論そのものの問題を投げかけていることを示唆した。と同時に、将来ハイチにおいて国民的コンセンサスが構築されることになれば、その分析が新たな政治理論の構築にも資することになると指摘した。